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Like many phenomena that emerged parallel to that “place” we call the 
Internet, open source production has long been described via metaphors of 
spatiality, location, and presence. This trend likely started with program-
mer and open source software advocate Eric S. Raymond’s early influen-
tial essays “The Cathedral and the Bazaar” (1997) and “Homesteading 
the Noosphere” (1999), both of which compare open source projects to a 
variety of public and private spaces, ecosystems, and architectural forms.1 
In the late 1990s and through the last decade, as discussion of the politics 
of open source production has shifted more explicitly toward questions 
of copyright, appropriation, and intellectual property, open source pro-
ponents have increasingly invoked “the commons”—noncommodified 
public spaces and land areas—as conceptual reference points for rethink-
ing intellectual property rights via the long and depressing history of the 
privatization of such resources.2 Without glossing over too many internal 
variations within these analogies, we might state that their connecting 
thread has most often been an emphasis on the relative novelty of open 
source projects, their scarcity among trends toward the increasing com-
modification of materials and services, and their general distinction from 
and counterposition to the traditional practices of capitalist economies; 
in other words, if open source and subsequent practices of participatory 
culture and voluntary collaborative labor have long been thought of as 
locations, it is perhaps because of their hoped-for function as some “other 
place”: a heterotopia or utopia that is surrounded on all sides by the much 
larger and more familiar terrain of the global market.3
By contrast the contributors to this special issue on “Open Source Cul-
ture and Aesthetics” might be taken as both privileging a temporal rather 
than spatial approach to thematizing open source production as well as 
disputing its peripheral status; more specifically, they all craft their point 
of intervention in reference to questions of periodization, suggesting 
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that a broad historical transformation is under way as the primary prag-
matic principles of open source software communities—that production 
and distribution processes can be made both more efficient and effective 
by leveraging the labor, contributions, and feedback of large groups of 
users—increasingly seem central to, rather than a novelty within, con-
temporary economic and cultural production. This shift in perspective 
might be more properly taken as more than just an alternative frame-
work for comparison. Rather, it marks a moment in which open source 
ceases to be understandable by way of comparisons to other phenomena 
and instead takes on its own explanatory value. And, indeed, open source 
as a term or concept has become its own analogical referent, one that links 
a vast field of practices moving far from its initial origins and intentions in 
software programming. Although we briefly detail the arc of this expan-
sion later in this essay, we leave the final word on the importance of this 
origin, as well as how appropriate it is to configure it as an antecedent to 
what we are calling “open source culture and aesthetics,” to Christopher 
Kelty, who reads the works of the other authors collected here through 
the filter of his own ethnographic research on open source software com-
munities, and his perspective as a more-than-interested observer in how 
the concepts and techniques popularized there have been integrated into 
everything from bioinformatics to social media. For now, however, we 
take it for granted that constitutive features of the production model in-
cubated in free and open source software programming have spread dra-
matically in three general directions:
(1) a multiplication in what vectors can be taken to occupy the role of “source” 
beyond the realm of computer programming, with genetic “code” being 
perhaps the most notable and literal substitution, but one followed by 
“open content” systems for knowledge production and reference such 
as Wikipedia, and various other endeavors encouraging the creation of 
alternative and nonproprietary licensing arrangements for phenomena 
typically recognized as intellectual property, from chemical composi-
tions to artistic works,4
(2) an even larger field of processes that leverage the distribution and orga-
nization of voluntary (unremunerated) labor found in crowdsourcing 
(the outsourcing of portions of a larger task to an indefinite group of 
volunteers); prosumption (a consumer’s participation in the produc-
tion of the good or service being consumed), including the increasing 
prevalence of beta and usability testing on everything from software to 
chairs; citizen journalism (the contribution of nonprofessionals to the 
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coverage, documentation, and public discussion of news events); and 
participatory and social media of all types; and, finally,5
(3) the aggregation of “passively” contributed demographic data, geographic 
positions, and consumer dispositions to generate “just in time” advertising 
and messaging strategies; here we find the primary source for the mass 
expansion of niche and proximal marketing that has driven the “co-
crafting” of both products and politicians over the last two decades.6
Taken together, these phenomena constitute a significant reordering of eco-
nomic and communication networks, as well as systems of social power 
more generally. The emerging configurations in each area draw their 
value and function through, on the one hand, the flexible division of ma-
terials, processes, and tasks that might be shaped, altered, or fulfilled by 
leveraging the individual contributions of ad hoc communities, and, on 
the other hand, the broadest possible inclusion of individuals of all back-
grounds into such collectivities. The historical positioning of open source 
software production as a really existing alternative (so to speak) to the 
traditional production processes of contemporary capitalism may seem 
overblown when, as Kelty suggests, the majority of work on open source 
software projects is performed by the paid employees of large corpora-
tions. This is at least one way in which the old spatial metaphor is still 
immensely useful—if open source software projects can be thought of, 
as Raymond sometimes does, as “neighborhoods,” then they are neigh-
borhoods that seem to be rapidly gentrifying (Kelty, in this issue, p. 471). 
However, the three general phenomena just outlined suggest traffic in the 
other direction, as well, with the methods developed in open source soft-
ware production increasingly integrated with and transforming capitalist 
production itself. In both cases, what is at issue is the alternative character 
of such production; what seems to emerge with a generalization of “open 
source” is a sort of dual migration of processes that, at the very least, call 
on us to examine the ways both “neighborhoods” are changing.
What becomes of the other vector tied to early conceptions of open 
source production—that analogy called utopia—is a much thornier ques-
tion and equally at issue for the authors collected here. We ourselves will 
return to it, but first, by way of introduction, we situate the other essays 
in this issue within a more explicit discussion of open source culture and 
aesthetics as a periodization of the present. We end with a consideration 
that more often comes first in analyses of recent changes in practices of 
production and consumption: the relationship of open source culture and 
aesthetics to what we used to call political economy, particularly the chal-
lenges posed to traditional conceptions of labor and profit, or, perhaps 
340 ANTONIO CERASO AND JEFF PRUCHNIC
more vulgarly, value itself in the contemporary moment. Before that, 
however, we address two other relevant, if much less discussed, catego-
ries impacted by the practices under review here, changes in the form 
and function of technological mediation, as well as those of at least a no-
table current of contemporary aesthetics. In both, we will suggest that it 
is quite explicitly the classifications of “form” and “function”—or media 
and technics, and representation and action, respectively—that seem to 
have become indiscernible, or at least strangely bounded together, in the 
age of open source culture and aesthetics.
From Open Source Software to Open Source Culture
As mentioned, the essays included in this special issue rely to varying de-
grees on the generalization of the term open source. Even a cursory exami-
nation of the contemporary media phylum would suggest that this term 
carries with it a general signification. We hear of open source politics, 
open source journalism, open source biology, open source music, open 
source education and universities, and so on. What it means to be open 
and what exactly is referred to by source would seem to differ in each case, 
while a general transformation of the activities is nonetheless imputed. 
The specificity and generality of any given usage would seem to depend 
on the distance of the modifier from its original use within software pro-
gramming itself. Before situating the contributions, then, it may be useful 
to gauge this distance by reviewing the emergence of open source as a set 
of relations within software programming, with a view toward think-
ing the generalization of “open source” as a term or concept in the early 
twenty-first century.
Open source software rhetoric rather compulsively develops its own 
historical narratives along two major fronts. First, its historians and prac-
titioners locate open source programming within a longer tradition in 
which the freedom to work on technology in general and software in par-
ticular was the standard. This approach is already present in what might 
be the first such narrative, Steven Levy’s 1983 best seller Hackers: Heroes 
of the Computer Revolution, the epilogue of which (titled “The Last of 
the True Hackers”) narrates the emergence of free software philosophy 
around the figure of Richard M. Stallman.7 The history of computing, in 
this account, was always a history of access to and social sharing of source 
code, user modification of existing programs and systems, and general 
experimentation with technology in the service of innovation. Both Eric 
Raymond and Pekka Himanen feel compelled to include a similar “history 
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of hackerdom” in their accounts of open source and hacker communities, 
where that history sketches out the practices of access and sharing that 
developed in mid-twentieth-century technocultures, particularly within 
academic and hobbyist communities.8 Stallman’s own accounts and ex-
amples tend to take an even wider view, noting, among other things, that 
the popularity of working on and tinkering with cars contributed to the 
U.S. military’s success in the Second World War, since so many ordinary 
servicemen could fix broken-down jeeps.9 The tendency to harken back 
to this history of hackerdom and general tinkering, however, always con-
tains a prelapsarian element, with the Fall represented by the onset of 
aggressive intellectual property restrictions, especially as they attached 
themselves to software through the late 1970s and early 1980s. If Stallman 
is already in 1983 the last of the hackers, it is because commercial interests 
have “destroyed” his “community” at MIT, which is to say, the technical 
capacity to access source code had fallen under restriction, while the social 
and economic structures that promoted sharing of code had already been 
affected by commodification.
Where software code, at least within an academic and hobbyist cul-
ture, may have been viewed as a public domain common resource that en-
abled programmers to access, learn about, and improve upon programs, 
it began to be treated legally not as a resource of scientific knowledge but 
a proprietary and restricted commodity, the creative product from which 
businesses drew value. The history of software development (and techno-
logical development in general) suggests that this narrative can be read as 
both accurate and partial; as Martin Campbell-Kelly and other historians 
demonstrate, there were always tensions and settlements between user 
collaboration and proprietary concerns.10 The compulsive deployment of 
this historical narrative, in this sense, can be seen as an attempt to normal-
ize free and open source programming, positioning it as the standard, or 
at least traditional, mode of software development encroached upon by 
ill-conceived and nontechnical (that is, commercial) interests.
The second historical narrative takes us to the other side of the Fall, 
identifying the personalities and moments of free and open source pro-
gramming itself as it struggled against and negotiated with such external 
forces. In this narrative, free software emerged as a phenomenon and social 
movement during the 1980s, largely around Stallman and his supporters, 
in part as a response to changes in intellectual property laws and academic-
business partnerships. Where Stallman tends to narrate these changes as 
local phenomena experienced by his “community” at the MIT Artificial 
Intelligence Lab, they can also be read as local effects of broader legisla-
tive and judicial decisions, among them the Dole-Bayh Act of 1980 (the 
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University–Small Business Patents Procedures Act), the Patent and Trade-
mark Amendment Act of 1980, and the Economic Tax Recovery Act of 
1981, as well as a number of judicial decisions stemming from the 1976 
amendments to the Copyright Act. In 1984, Stallman began the GNU Proj-
ect (GNU’s Not Unix), developing, largely on his own, initial components 
for a nonproprietary computer operating system. In the March 1985 issue 
of Dr. Dobbs Journal, a magazine marketed specifically toward software 
programmers, Stallman published the GNU Manifesto, which stood as his 
ethicopolitical statement of purpose for the GNU Project.11 The manifesto 
announced the project to the programming community while laying out its 
technical and political aims: Stallman sought to counter the effects of the 
changing intellectual property landscape in software development by build-
ing programs that would be accessible to users, who could then examine the 
code and modify it as they saw fit. Stallman’s organization, the Free Soft-
ware Foundation (FSF), would manage the project and advocate against 
the encroachment of intellectual property laws on software development. 
Stallman and the FSF’s crucial social innovation was the GNU General 
Public License, or GPL, which was designed to prevent appropriation of 
public domain code by stipulating that any use of GPL-licensed code in a 
new program would require that that program itself be freely accessible, 
modifiable, and replicable.
The next major event in this narrative occurs in 1991, when Linus 
Torvalds, a computer science graduate student in Finland, built an oper-
ating-system kernel that would turn the components and programs the 
FSF had developed into a full working operating system. Since he had 
used a stripped-down educational version of the Unix operating system 
(called Minix) to aid in kernel development, he called the resulting op-
erating system Linux. Rather than proceed with the development on his 
own, he released the code on the Internet, asking for improvements. The 
response from programmers was immediate and successful: a wide base 
of user-developers emerged who identified and fixed bugs, added func-
tionality, and built the GNU/Linux operating system into a product that 
rivaled commercially produced software.12
There is certainly a Great Man feel to much historical work on open 
source, but one suspects that Stallman and Torvalds also function figura-
tively within these narratives. Stallman tends to be positioned as the ethi-
cal idealist, the activist programmer struggling against an unjust property 
regime. Torvalds, for his part, is the “accidental revolutionary,” function-
ing as a kind of fun-loving hacker and thereby standing in for broader 
aesthetic and pragmatic approaches.13 The historical accounts tend to 
focus on Stallman and Torvalds, in other words, not only because they 
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provided such crucial contributions to free and open source development, 
but also because they serve as conceptual personae, staking out the po-
litical, economic, and aesthetic territory of free and open source software 
practices.
The Stallman–Torvalds history of free and open source development, 
in any case, can perhaps be mitigated by noting that numerous businesses, 
organizations, and institutions that picked up on and forwarded the cause 
of open source; it was never quite as anarchic or personality-driven as first 
appearances would suggest. By the late 1990s, open source proponents 
and organizations had launched a number of successful rhetorical salvos, 
including Raymond’s The Cathedral and the Bazaar and a number of tech-
nical and political texts emerging from O’Reilly Media, which was also 
busy organizing various open source conventions and conferences, and 
setting out definitions and licenses that would more effectively integrate 
open source with the then booming (and ballooning) dot-com industry. 
Microsoft openly (through leaked documents, in any case) worried about 
the quality and success of the GNU/Linux systems, which proliferated 
online and continued to see massive improvements developed by volun-
teer programmers, even if programs and projects themselves were often 
controlled by recognizable organizational entities.14 Moreover, the devel-
opment and licensing principles of free and open source software dem-
onstrated that a community of volunteer programmers would improve 
and fix code efficiently without the direction of a firm or even without 
compensation, all under the protection of novel intellectual property ar-
rangements that were rapidly being mainstreamed. Free and open source 
software could thus be seen to operate as a counterweight to the business 
model of proprietary software. But the branch of organizations and de-
velopers more associated with Torvalds, Raymond, and O’Reilly increas-
ingly judged what it viewed as Stallman’s radicalism as too restrictive and 
sought to reposition the movement as “open source” in order to make it 
more business-friendly.15 This caused a rift between the political aims of 
the FSF and the open source movement, which sought the proliferation 
of free and open source software processes both in the public and within 
industry.16
The open source branch’s rhetorical repositioning was generally suc-
cessful. The actual software programs produced through free and open 
source software processes have gained more widespread appeal, whereas 
they had been previously restricted to the relatively small groups of ex-
perts. GNU/Linux-based operating systems have been mainstreamed 
through organizations such as Canonical, which leads the development 
for the open source operating system Ubuntu, and free and open source 
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software programs like the Firefox browser and Apache server are widely 
used and compete for or have even attained (in the case of Apache) market 
dominance. For every Firefox and Apache there are thousands of smaller 
projects for software programs with both recognizable and inscrutably 
obscure functions. Furthermore, while free and open source software 
communities continue to present themselves as positioned against propri-
etary software, the 2000s have witnessed the general acceptance of open 
source development in the software industry. If the debates within free 
and open source communities of the late 1990s revolved around the per-
ceived purity of various versions of the GPL and open source licenses, 
today’s discussions involve the status of contribution agreements, as major 
software industry partners contribute to and organize code bases and 
open source projects.
More striking than this fairly standard history of open source in the 
field of software is the prevalence of invoking free and open source soft-
ware production as either a paradigmatic example or synecdoche for 
broader transformations in cultural and economic production. Writing 
from a legal (and classical liberal) perspective, Lawrence Lessig points 
to free and open source development to demonstrate the correct balance 
between intellectual property rights and freedom to innovate from exist-
ing cultural and technical material.17 Yochai Benkler, writing in a similar 
vein, points to free and open source software as “but one salient example 
of a broader phenomenon” that he encourages us to view not only as a 
“new mode of production” but as the basis for expanding critical citizen-
ship and reinvigorating the public sphere.18 Comparable exemplary uses 
of open source can be found in the arguments of numerous other legal 
and cultural theorists working the intellectual property circuit. For in-
stance, though writing in a decidedly more Hayekian tone, James Sur-
owiecki notes that open source programming, Linux in particular, “is 
not all that different from a market;” it thus serves as the “surprising,” 
but nonetheless effective, model for successful market-based decentral-
ization.19 In another chamber-of-commerce–friendly series of examples, 
Don Tapscott and Anthony D. Williams’s Wikinomics: How Mass Collabo-
ration Changes Everything (2006) identifies free and open source software 
programming as a pioneer practice that developed new and replicable 
production  processes—processes that can now be identified and deployed 
in almost limitless market contexts.20
If both liberal legal theory and neoliberal market theory locate open 
source practices as exemplary, there has been no less enthusiasm from 
the political left. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri turn to open source 
to explicate perhaps the most troublesome political question facing their 
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concept of a multitude, viewing “the political decision-making capacity of 
the multitude in analogy with the collaborative development of computer 
software and the innovations of the open source movement.”21 Indeed, 
Hardt and Negri push the figure in a direction similar to Benkler’s hopes 
for a rejuvenated public sphere (we suspect both Hardt and Negri would 
reject that), positioning open source as a vehicle for “understanding the 
democracy of the multitude,” which takes the form of “an open-source 
society, that is, a society whose source code is revealed so that we can all 
work collaboratively to solve its bugs and create new, better social pro-
grams.”22 It’s certainly tempting to explore this odd synecdochal uptake 
of “open source” across otherwise seemingly severe political and philo-
sophical divisions. At this point, however, it will be sufficient to observe 
that between the late 1990s and mid-2000s, the relatively limited practice 
of free and open source software programming—a rather specialized and 
scarce activity even today—exerted a general cultural fascination.
This effect may be owing to the location of software programming 
within three broad and interrelated historical shifts: the prevalence of in-
formation production, particularly as it intersected with the availability of 
global networks and new media forms (the commodity form); the legal and 
policy changes designed in part to stabilize value and property relation-
ships for such production (the value form); and the sheer difficulty of ef-
ficiently managing such productive relations through industrial methods 
developed for physical commodities (the labor form). For each of these 
ostensibly period-defining formal developments, software production 
could be said to encapsulate fundamental tensions. At a purely techni-
cal level, source code is located, so to speak, between the interface, with 
its much analyzed metaphors (the briefcase, the file), and the machine, 
with its memory and electronic pathways; as human-readable language 
with its own syntax and semantics, and as instructions that shape the 
interface by being compiled for the machine, source code may mark an 
intense space or moment where representation and function become in-
discernible. To the extent that the commodity form of even informational 
products had tended to rely on that distinction (to ground the difference 
between expression and idea in U.S. copyright law, for instance), software 
in general could become a technical difficulty for the commodity form 
itself, which in turn modifies value. Software programming thus becomes 
a key technical site of conflict in intellectual property disputes, but within 
existing forms of social organization that heighten those conflicts. More 
specifically, software, especially through the mid-1970s and early 1980s 
could not be disentangled from the competing values of its multiple sites 
of production, which included an emerging personal computer software 
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industry, well-established scientific and academic spaces, and historically 
widespread and vibrant amateur hobbyist communities. Both the juridi-
cally unstable status of source code as a technical object and the social 
groups that engaged in software production through the 1970s and 1980s 
could generate the arguments, case law, and legislation that would estab-
lish or extend broader restrictive principles, while its practitioners were 
similarly well positioned to devise the strategies that would subvert these 
principles, the GPL among them.
Finally, software programming became an important site for rethink-
ing and reworking industrial production methods and the organization of 
cognitive labor. Raymond’s account, for example, proposes to modify one 
of the classic managerial texts on programming, Frederick Brooks’s 1975 
The Mythical Man-Month: Essays in Software Engineering. The complexity 
of sequential debugging and the communication problems involved in 
making software functional meant, for Brooks, that adding “manpower” 
to projects could be counterproductive; indeed, the basic conceptual ma-
chinery of the Fordist assembly line failed the software project managers 
of the 1960s and 1970s because the communicative work involved in pro-
gramming added time to the projects, which is to say, cost. Brooks dis-
covered, in other words, that the Fordist production models that software 
project managers initially sought to institute had always been in the first 
instance particular temporal configurations that did not quite fit the ac-
tivities of programming. The man-month is in this sense mythical because 
the measurable, temporal form of standard commodity production breaks 
down where the work becomes cognitive and communicative.
Raymond’s response in The Cathedral and the Bazaar does not deny 
this problem but instead presents a radical solution and alternative orga-
nization of temporality, combining a core decision-making group with 
a larger, indefinite group of contributors. One can add “manpower” to 
this indefinite group while restricting coordination and communication 
time to the core group, thereby limiting the “full Brooksian overhead” 
cost of the communicative labor.23 Considered as a concrete business prob-
lem, the open source solution is certainly novel. It may exert a force of 
fascination, however, because it signals a shift in incorporeal relations, a 
fundamental instability in the time and location of work. What Raymond 
does not address, for example, is the form of temporality that escapes this 
overhead, which itself assumes a shape as indefinite as the qualities and 
motivations of the large contributor group. If, as Christian Marazzi has it, 
the “centrality of language in post-Fordist production and the putting to 
work of the cognitive properties of the workforce leads to a crisis of mea-
surability of single work operations,” software highlights the managerial 
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problems inherent in this crisis while presenting innovative productive 
relations that seem to offer solutions.24
If the valorization process in industrial economies tended to operate 
through the tangible character of the physical commodity and the form of 
temporality associated with its production, software becomes an index of 
transformation, a site where the whole social logic of value experiences its 
limit. As a similar limit is experienced in other fields, however, the kinds 
of relations that developed in software production seem to operate in and 
across those other fields. Put another way, the relations through which 
open source operates could be said to function diagrammatically. Dia-
grams, as Gilles Deleuze describes them, are not fixed representations of 
power or ideal forms to be copied, but abstract machines that constantly 
evolve, “unmaking preceding realities” and developing new modes of 
organization.25 Software production functions as a point of extreme sat-
uration for sets of relationships that are solidifying and evolving across 
multiple spheres of activity. These multiple spheres of activity don’t copy 
the relations manifesting themselves in software production, since they 
are already ongoing and developing independently while encountering 
various frictions related to their specific practices. Where activities and 
relations that resemble free and open source practices develop in, say, fur-
niture design, it is not because furniture designers are simply replicating 
or imitating software practices. The resemblance indicates, instead, that 
a set of material conditions and incorporeal relationships playing them-
selves out in programming are also playing out, evolving, and mixing 
with previously existing forms in furniture design.
If we retool Michel Foucault’s insight on what he called the swarm-
ing of disciplinary mechanisms, we might say that, in the maturing net-
work society, programming—understood as a set of technical and social 
 relationships—starts to resemble economic, political, and aesthetic phe-
nomena of all kinds, which all start to resemble programming. But we 
might also better recognize Foucault’s sly tautological joke in the original, 
where “prisons resemble factories, school, barracks, hospitals, which all 
resemble prisons.”26 Foucault returns to “prisons” again at the end of the 
clause to emphasize the multiple reinforcement of the relations as they 
solidify in and across actual institutions, discourses, techniques, and prac-
tices; the second resemblance undercuts the very notion of resemblance. 
Or, to put it in the slightly more blunt tone of Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari, “[t]here is no metaphor here; the factories are prisons, they do 
not resemble prisons, they are prisons.”27 It is in this sense that the move-
ment from open source software to open source culture need not be read 
as either a rhetorical figure of or ideational abstraction from the concrete 
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practices of programming or organizing software projects. In the next 
sections, we turn to open source culture, understood broadly as those 
other sites and fields that seem to develop open source practices, both to 
situate the articles that follow and to examine one of the effects that open 
source relationships seem to produce wherever they appear: the sugges-
tion, or even enterprise, of utopia.
The Logic of Open Source Culture
We might begin periodizing open source culture itself by introducing 
another work by way of contrast, one of the “greatest hits” in the genre 
and one written in the days when open source software production (or, 
more broadly software itself as we have come to know it) was first getting 
off of the ground: Fredric Jameson’s Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic 
of Late Capitalism (1991). Our interest here, of course, is not in pointing 
out the various ways that this work, published in the very early 90s and 
based on research stretching back to the mid-80s, might fail to accurately 
diagnose contemporary cultural tendencies. As Jeffrey T. Nealon has re-
cently suggested, though Postmodernism rightfully remains a perennial 
syllabus favorite and critical theory touchstone, reading it as any kind of 
timely diagnosis of present day culture would go against Jameson’s own 
methodological axiom—“always historicize”—one we also intend to fol-
low here.28 In any case, it also seems that at least the fundamental ob-
servation of the work, namely, that “everything in our social life—from 
economic value and state power to practices and the very structure of 
the psyche itself—can be said to have become ‘cultural’ in some original 
and yet untheorized sense,” still seems to ring very much true, even if the 
lion’s share of work in the critical humanities and social sciences since 
the time of Jameson’s writing has been devoted to attempting this absent 
“theorization.”29
Rather, we are interested in Jameson’s treatment of computing tech-
nology in the text—an awkward treatment, perhaps necessarily so, given 
its appearance during what we might have to call for lack of a better term 
the “old days” of “new media.” Computers first appear in Postmodern-
ism via Jameson’s critique of their failure to be, or to inspire, objets d’art, 
as machines “whose outer shell has no emblematic or visual power” that 
might excite in the way that machine guns did for Moretti or automobile 
factories did for Rivera (37). This failure quickly becomes a productive 
one, however, as Jameson uses it to “represent” the difficulties of repre-
sentation itself during the time of his writing; the opacity of the computer 
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becomes a synecdoche for the difficulty of comprehending “the whole 
new decentered global network of the third stage of capitalism itself,” 
a perplex that cashes out on one side in “high-tech paranoia” and con-
spiracy theory (the desperate need to spin a pattern out of the incompre-
hensible) and on the other in the “postmodern sublime” (the celebration 
of incomprehensibility as its own category) (38).
More importantly given our interests here, Jameson’s foray through 
computing technology provides a key transitional point connecting his 
appropriation of Ernest Mandel’s periodizing move in Late Capitalism 
(1975), the division of recent history into several “machine ages” or “fun-
damental breaks or quantum leaps in the evolution of machinery under 
capital” (35), and Jameson’s unique extension of Mandel’s “Third Ma-
chine Age,” one dominated by what we would now call new media, the 
“machines of reproduction rather than production” driving capitalism at 
the time of his writing (37). There is, as one might expect, a certain ten-
sion inherent in this shift. Mandel’s machine ages—the eras of the steam 
engine (industrialization), the combustion engine (Fordism), and “elec-
tronics, automation, and nuclear energy” (post-Fordism)—themselves 
being an adaptation of Marx’s writings on “motive machines,” provide 
for Jameson a way to promote the relevance of Marx’s nineteenth-century 
work in reading “the multinational or consumer capitalism” dominat-
ing late-twentieth century capitalism (36).30 However, whereas Marx’s 
“motive machines” referred largely to literal tools and factory hardware, 
and Mandel’s “machine ages” mainly describe literal “engines” or energy 
sources for machinery, Jameson’s turn to new media is an attempt to link 
up with these older methodological approaches while also changing the 
exemplary core of his analysis from machines to media. This shift is appar-
ent in his turn from questions of technology “itself,” in relation to pro-
duction methods, to the ways such technologies are mediated by cultural 
responses (as in the aforementioned references to Moretti and Rivera). By 
the time a reader reaches Postmodernism’s chapter on “video,” Jameson is 
signaling how the centrality of media necessitates a certain rereading of 
culture in general: “It is because we have had to learn that culture today 
is a matter of media that we have finally begun to get it through our head 
that culture was always that, and that the older forms or genres, or indeed 
the older spiritual exercises and meditations, thoughts and expressions, 
were also in their very different ways media products” (68).
One of the major results of the perspectival shift described here by 
Jameson, through which the ubiquity of media today leads us to both 
project and retroject its importance in producing cultural change, is noted 
at the very start of Alexander R. Galloway’s contribution to this issue: 
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the vast profusion of books “on digital this and digital that” over the last 
decade or so that model different response to this revelation, from the 
rereading of cultural history as the “history of media in culture” to pre-
dictions of how new media will drastically change the future of politics, 
commerce, and society as a whole (377). However, as Galloway suggests, 
the changes in modes of production that we have been gathering around 
the concept of open source here seem to require something like a further 
rereading, perhaps one akin to the shift that introduced the mediacen-
tric viewpoint in both academic and popular analysis in the first place. 
In particular, Galloway draws our attention to how, ten years after the 
publication of the central reference point of his essay (Lev Manovich’s 
The Language of New Media, 2001) and about twenty years after the work 
we’ve been focusing on over the last few pages (Jameson’s Postmodernism), 
it seems necessary to rethink the relationship between the intellectual 
concerns of critical theory that grew up parallel to the expansion of new 
media and the “general open sourcing of all media systems” today (383). 
Although new media prior to “open sourcing” was a provider of signifi-
cant content for cultural and critical theory forming around questions of 
essence and simulation, the present paradigm “has almost nothing to do 
with the lingering phenomenological anxiety around presence and truth 
fueling post-structuralism’s long obsession over sources” (383). Indeed, it 
seems as if at least some methods of critical analysis (and of critique as a 
mode of intervention) have themselves become subsumed in contempo-
rary capitalism and its structuring technologies: “What was once an intel-
lectual intervention is now part of the mechanical infrastructure” (384).
We might dwell for a moment on this last point—Galloway’s confla-
tion of the intellectual and the mechanical in relation to media systems—as 
a way to briefly suggest our own all-too brief and vulgar historical schema 
for periodizing open source production as it is approached in this issue of 
Criticism. In particular, we want to leverage the connection between the 
intellectual and mechanical made in Galloway’s foregoing statement—a 
connection that is also, we take it, implicit in the phenomena with which 
we began this essay (from open author and open content online presences, 
to crowdsourcing and prosumption techniques, to feedback mechanisms 
for niche marketing and niche messaging). All of these latter processes 
seem to escape the confines of both Mandel’s notion of “machines” that 
center methods of labor and production, as well as the more contemporary 
notion of media as the center of cultural representation and (re)produc-
tion; more specifically, we might say that they combine or hybridize these 
two forms in a way that was orginaly hinted at in the (now outmoded) 
notion of information technologies as a category, or, even more precisely, to 
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use a term favored by a thinker who served as something of foil for both 
Mandel and Jameson, what sociologist Daniel Bell called intellectual tech-
nologies: techniques built around the feedback between generic human 
and technological capacities, particularly the ways in which technologies 
tend to exteriorize human capabilities while at the same time promoting 
cultural changes that in turn shape human mentalité and behavior.31 At 
the risk of condensing around eight hundred years of Western culture 
into four paragraphs, we will suggest in the following that such a histori-
cal rereading along the lines of intellectual technologies may be the best 
way to put into relief the central questions of contemporary culture and 
social power as they are indexed against open source production and pur-
sued by the authors collected here.
We might say that a history of this type covering the European late 
Middle Ages and early modernity has already been attempted, notably 
as a side issue in Foucault’s The Order of Things (1966) and its focus on 
the ways techniques of representation and analogy were turned into the 
“tools” of written tables, taxonomies, and grammars. However, the most 
expansive and elegant treatment is likely historian Alfred W. Crosby’s The 
Measure of Reality: Quantification and Western Society, 1250–1600 (1997). 
For Crosby, the period under review is marked by a rapid increase in pan-
tometrics, or systems of universal measurement within European culture, 
aesthetics, and economics; the rise of standardized units of measurement 
and systems for translating and representing them at least partially ac-
counts for the quickening pace of technological and scientific advance-
ment in Europe during this time. This change in ways of apprehending 
and representing reality, Crosby argues, also demonstrates a fundamen-
tal change in Western rationality and sensibility. As contrasted with the 
Greek intellectual culture, the interest in quantity and quantification can 
be clearly contrasted with Greek Antiquity’s obsession with qualities and 
qualification, absolutes and essences.32 More importantly for our purposes 
here, the move from absolutes to pantometrics was in very important 
ways enabled by the construction of technologies that functioned both 
as means of representation (“and mediation”) and as tools for the actual 
performance of measuring and relating different quantities. The wide 
varieties of such technologies that emerged or became common from the 
Middle Ages to early modernity cataloged by Crosby—the populariza-
tion of “counting boards” as machines for performing and representing 
arithmetical operations, the construction of public clocks in town spaces 
to establish and regulate shared time, the expansion of gold currency and 
accounting books, revolutions in uniform cartography, the introduction 
of geometrical diagrams and methods into painting—notably perform 
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the dual functions of being both representations of a sort as well as tech-
nologies for establishing relationships between individuals and items, me-
diating economic exchanges, and establishing cultural norms.
To mark the time between the period studied in Crosby’s work and 
the one in which we are primarily interested here (the last half-century or 
so encompassing the development of computing technologies), we might 
hesitantly posit a period between these moments wherein pantometrics 
gives way to (or becomes further operationalized as) calculation. Indeed, 
the end of Crosby’s pantometric era corresponds roughly to the formaliza-
tion of calculation proper in mathematics, leading up to the coinvention 
of the infinitesimal calculus by Newton and Liebniz in mid-seventeenth 
century. We might take one of the key concepts of the that system, ad-
equality or the concept of “proximal equality,” as a suturing point for a 
large range of subsequent cultural changes based on the assumption of 
likely relationships between phenomena or the results of particular pro-
cesses, the turn away from methods for quantifying phenomena in the 
present as the primary motivating force of scientific and intellectual cul-
ture and toward procedures for predicting future states and effects. The 
effects of phenomena occupying a state between mediation and technology 
here and its impact on societal change during modernity might be found, 
for instance, in the increase in stock-exchange systems and early specu-
lative markets, as well as the vectors studied by Foucault in another of 
his works, Discipline and Punish (1975), the techniques and technologies, 
spectacles and sign systems, used to define social roles and modulate the 
future behavior of individuals.
Finally, we might suggest that we currently occupy a third and only 
recently emergent period in this history, one defined by the dominance of 
what we might call, to borrow another term from mathematics, algorith-
mics. Such a category would encompass complex processes that neither 
suppose a universal measure nor are necessarily based on the anticipation 
of discrete future states, but maintain a general equilibrium by flexibly 
incorporating and responding to variables within a given system. Here, 
of course, the computer, itself conceived around the potential for algorith-
mic processes, is perhaps the best synecdoche for the logical form being 
described, but one to which we might add video games as an aesthetic and 
entertainment form (one that, as Galloway writes elsewhere, serves as a 
prime example of a “subjective algorithm” embedded in a media form); 
the development of parametric methods in architecture, in which struc-
tural and decorative elements are rendered within the design stage so that 
altering one variable will automatically make necessary changes in other 
affected elements; and the marshaling of massive computing power to 
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model everything from the diverse possible futures for climate change to 
the construction of “game-theoretic” scenarios for identifying the best op-
tions for a government or corporation to make in response to thousands 
of possible changes in the global (political) economy.33
However, it is the systems of production that we have been describ-
ing here as “open source” that might provide the best example of the 
economic and cultural impact of such processes, as well as the ways they 
combine functions typically divided between “media” and “technology.” 
It is equally dissatisfying to attempt to think of the networks moderating, 
for example, the ways in which consumer trends or voter dispositions are 
collected and integrated into niche marketing and niche campaigning as 
either the operation of “media” or of technologies; similarly, the comput-
ing power and online presences that make possible the division and dis-
tribution of activities in crowdsourcing also seem to occupy a liminal state 
between these categories, or at least illustrate how their functions have 
become combined or confused within social media and systems of data 
aggregation. In this sense, the emergence of such vectors in what Crosby 
calls the quantification of Western society that seem so significant now, 
might be taken as not only the overturning of the emphasis on qualifica-
tion in Greek Antiquity but also undoing the coeval division between the 
concepts of logos (denoting “truth,” as well as language, accurate repre-
sentation, and social commonalities) and techne (our root word for “tech-
nology” and referencing, among other things, the duplication of natural 
processes via human contrivance and the subverting of natural process 
through mechanical means).
Defining such “technologics” as structuring principles for contem-
porary culture is very much a concern for not just Galloway, who is 
specifically asking after the status of new media in the present moment, 
but for all of the authors in this issue. We might see Jameson as having 
already hinted at a “becoming algorithmic” of contemporary culture in 
Postmodernism; namely, the algorithmic complexity, or irreducibility of 
“culture” in the present—the difficulty of “mapping a totality” or of 
representing culture in a time wherein culture “itself” seems to have 
saturated all of contemporary life, including our means of representa-
tion and mediation. The contributors collected here might be taken as 
shifting their objective from that of representing or “mapping” culture 
at the moment at which it seems to be taking on the complexity of an 
algorithm, to an explicit tracing of the effects produced when algorith-
mic logics become central to culture, the ways in which, since roughly 
the time of Jameson’s writing, these logics have restructured the onto-
logical status of individuals and groups (Ben Roberts), the modalities 
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of authorship and aesthetic production (Stephen Voyce), and the ever-
faster feedback loops of production and consumption as forces in the 
shaping of social subjectivity (Leisha Jones).
Open Source Aesthetics
Given the foregoing observations alone, we might have reason to suspect 
the existence of an open source aesthetic developing over the last few de-
cades in at least two different ways: as, most broadly, part of a presumed 
larger change in human mentalité and sensibility during a time saturated 
by collective communication and algorithmic interaction or, on more 
familiar terrain, via the assumption that aesthetic production processes 
are by necessity influenced by the dominant structure of commodity pro-
duction. Indeed, something of the former is suggested by Nicolas Bour-
riaud’s influential and controversial concept of relational aesthetics, an 
attempt to thematize contemporary art that reflects “the changing mental 
space opened for thought by the Internet.”34 Bourriaud finds this shift 
evidenced in artworks that create open-ended opportunities for interac-
tions between strangers—interactions in which the audience “is not in 
front of an object anymore but included in the process of its construc-
tion.”35 Examples include Rirkrit Tiravanija’s Untitled 1992 (Free), in 
which the artist cooked Thai curry in a makeshift kitchen within a Soho 
gallery and invited visitors to serve themselves, and Liam Gillick’s The 
Pinboard Project (1992), a series of bulletin boards holding advertisements, 
photos, and documents that can be rearranged and altered by the works’ 
“users.” For Bourriaud, works such as these continue the “emancipatory” 
struggle of earlier twentieth-century avant-gardes against “authoritarian 
and utilitarian forces,” but under “quite different philosophical, cultural, 
and social presuppositions.”36 In particular, the “subversive and critical 
function” of the art Bourriaud sees as participating in relational aesthetics 
comes not from the direct critique of societal conditions or the positing of 
utopian alternatives he associaties with both modernist art and 1960s art 
criticism, but rather from the creation of temporary “microtopias” that 
materially enact small-scale deviations from the dominant structures of 
contemporary social life.37
Somewhat more schematically, we find analysis of the latter vector—
the relationship between aesthetic praxis and current modes of mainstream 
economic production—in the ongoing study of immaterial labor in contem-
porary post-Marxist thought. Writers on this issue largely take their cue 
from Marx’s scattered, but consistent, interest in forms of labor that result 
 OPEN SOURCE CULTURE AND AESTHETICS 355
in no material commodity or in which the “product is inseparable from the 
act of producing,” notably that of, in Marx’s time, performing artists, actors, 
orators, and a variety of what we might now recognize as so-called knowl-
edge workers (teachers, physicians, clergy, etc.).38
 Although for Marx, in his time, production of this type was “so insig-
nificant compared with the totality of production” that it could be “left 
entirely out of account,” contemporary autonomist-influenced think-
ers such as Paolo Virno, Antonio Negri, and Maurizio Lazarrato have 
shaped their analyses of contemporary economic production on the vast 
expansion of such “immateriality” of both contemporary commodities 
and dominant labor practices. Although the notion that immaterial vec-
tors such as appearance, design, and cultural currency have become im-
portant if not inseparable components of contemporary commodities is 
by now a familiar one, the significant innovation of work on immaterial 
labor has been to show rapid changes on the other side of the equation, 
the explosion in labor power devoted to, as Lazzarato writes, the “defin-
ing and fixing and cultural and artistic standards, fashions, tastes, con-
sumer norms.”39 On the one hand, although the capacity to contribute 
to such a “defining and fixing” used to be, in Lazarrato’s phrasing, “the 
privileged domain of the bourgeoisie and its children,” the expansion of 
flexible structures of niche marketing and the “just-in-time” production 
of commodities for even small sectors of a potential market have funda-
mentally enlarged the number of individuals who can and do participate 
in this sphere. On the other hand, demands for workers to leverage their 
creative and intellectual capacities as a supplement to their material work 
has equally expanded; the former synecdoche for the rigid and unimagi-
native core of modern wage labor—the Fordist factory—is transformed 
in post-Fordism, or under “Toyotism,” into a symbol for how the creative 
problem-solving of floor workers and their liberal communication and 
collaboration with management fuel continual innovation and efficiency. 
Virno, for example, figures the transformed scene as follow: “Thirty years 
ago, in many factories there were signs up that commanded ‘Silence, men 
at work!’ . . . Today, in certain workshops, one could well put up signs 
mirroring those of the past, but declaring ‘Men at work here. Talk!.’”40
Thus, from the perspective of the history of capitalist labor, we see a 
strange shift; Marina Vishmidt observes: “[T]he axes of ‘creativity’ and 
‘flexibility’ once deemed endemic to the artist as constitutive exception to 
the law of value” become “valorized as universally desirable attributes” 
in the general labor market.41 From the perspective of the history of art 
proper, much modernist art looks increasingly like an eerie anticipation 
of these changes in labor and the commodity form; as Lazarrato writes, 
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a work such as one of Marcel Duchamp’s readymades simultaneously 
“deprofessionalizes the artist’s function” and emphasizes the power of 
aesthetic and immaterial production within capitalist economies.42
At first blush, Bourriaud’s notion of relational aesthetics and what 
Lazarrato calls the “aesthetic model” of immaterial labor, though each 
possessing their own unique explanatory power, might seem complemen-
tary enough. Indeed, both orient their interventions around marking the 
ways that contemporary information and communication technologies 
have altered our experiences of social interaction, and both take the ad 
hoc collaboration of small collectivities to be the primary way in which 
quotidian social life can or does overlap with aesthetic experience. How-
ever, it may be more useful thinking the two together in terms of the ways 
they contradict or cancel each other out and therefore underscore the dif-
ficulty of identifying some recognizable change in aesthetic practice that 
might refract the changes wrought by what we have been calling open 
source culture here (or, one might say, the difficulty of identifying “an 
aesthetic response” in a moment wherein culture and economics as whole 
seems to have been “aestheticized” to some degree).
More specifically, the dominance of immaterial labor in the present 
moment as sketched by Lazzarato and other autonomist-influenced com-
mentators would seem to give the lie to Bourriaud’s claims that relational 
artists offer the chance to participate in compelling alternatives to every-
day life. To reference only the aforementioned works, it is quite possible 
that administrators in your workplace have followed relevant literature 
on employee morale- and team-building efforts and thus provide com-
munity bulletin boards not unlike those constructed as part of Gillick’s 
The Pinboard Project. Similarly, Tiravanija’s Untitled 1992 (Free) may be 
designed to jar your average gallerygoer’s notion of art’s boundaries, but 
it might also remind them of their last corporate off-site; indeed, it’s not 
at all unlikely that you have been afforded the opportunity to serve your-
self at a makeshift kitchen as part of a “work-related” function (if you’re 
“lucky,” it may have in fact been at an art gallery). Overall, Bourriaud’s 
claims for the oppositional qualities (however mild) of relational art as 
creating “spaces where alternative forms of sociability, critical models and 
moments of constructed conviviality are worked out”43 seem to short- 
circuit in a time when “constructed conviviality” operates more as a norm 
of everyday social experience than as its alternative. Indeed, it is hard to 
see the difference between Bourriaud’s descriptions of his “microtopians” 
and Lazarrato’s characterization of the “managerial class” during the 
dominance of immaterial labor with its emphasis on “the eliciting of social 
cooperation” of small groups, or between his celebration of artworks for 
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which audience members “are included in the process of its production” 
and Lazarrato’s definition of the postindustrial commodity as “the result 
of a creative process that involves both the produce and the consumer.”44
Moving in the opposite direction, the limitation of leveraging theories 
of immaterial labor to define a contemporary aesthetic is much simpler, 
if no less significant. Tracking the immaterialization of labor against the 
concomitant aestheticization of cultural and economic production tells us 
an awful lot about structural transformations in the sphere of labor and 
the process of valorization in contemporary capitalism, but these revela-
tions come at the expense of providing any insight into contemporary art 
as providing an aesthetic reflection beyond the simple mirroring of con-
temporary modes of production; thus, they tend to reserve for art only 
the role of confirming the saturation of aesthetic techniques into culture 
as a whole. Another way of putting this would be to suggest that the per-
spective on art “itself” offered in theories of immaterial labor occlude 
commentary on art in the present while offering ways to reread its past 
and predict its future. On the one hand, it becomes possible to retrace art 
history to capture the moments through which the tendency of artistic 
production methods to mirror those of the generic modes of production 
begins to reverse itself, leaving us to the present day, in which they be-
come increasingly indiscernible. On the other hand, it leaves us waiting to 
imagine a future aesthetic that might in some way separate these modes 
and return art to its proper role and/or potential changes in categories of 
labor that would provide the necessary conditions to make such a separa-
tion possible.45 The latter attempt might amount to a strange inversion of 
one of Marx’s most-quoted (if poorly understood) comments about artistic 
production “after” capitalism: “In a communist society there are no paint-
ers but only people who engage in painting among other activities.”46 In 
the regime of immaterial production, the problem instead is that every-
one is already expected to engage in the aesthetic mode of production 
“among other activities” more traditionally recognizable as labor. Thus, 
the concomitant wish is instead for a society wherein people could be just 
painters or art could take on a role, and artists take on a vocation, that is 
not already automatically subsumed within immaterial labor in general.
All of which is to say, in both cases, the sticking point is the apparent 
mutual subsumption of aesthetics and generic cultural production—one 
brought to the fore in contemporary theories of the aesthetic mode of im-
material labor and one (unconsciously) performed in the works Bourri-
aud identifies with relational aesthetics. When the realms of the aesthetic 
and everyday reality appear to entirely overlap in this way, it becomes im-
possible for art to fulfill its modern function of uniquely refracting rather 
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than merely reproducing social forms, to serve, in Theodor Adorno’s 
memorable phrasing, as “the social antithesis of society” while not being 
“directly deducible from it.”47
It bears repeating that this problematic emerges out of the ever-tighter 
feedback loops between production, consumption, and contribution that 
we have been referring to under the title of open source culture in these 
pages, the ways in which material products and intangible experiences are 
delivered with the expectation of further modification by, and/or designed 
around the existing preferences and dispositions of, their eventual “users.” 
In this sense, it is tempting to give up and conclude that it is contemporary 
capitalism, not art, that has resolved what Deleuze calls the “wrenching 
duality” of aesthetics that provides its reflective power, its manifestations 
as both “a theory of sensibility as the form of possible experience” and “a 
theory of art as the reflection of real experience.”48 As Deleuze goes on to 
argue, for these two roles to be synthesized “the conditions of experience 
in general must become conditions of real experience” and the work of art 
becomes one of constant experimentation. This experiment—the mak-
ing equivalent of the possible and the real—now seems to find a more 
appropriate home in the research and development (R&D) wings of cor-
porations than in the “laboratories” of installation art. In any case, in a 
time wherein the Great Indoors retail outlet offers 1,500 different styles of 
drawer pulls and General Electric’s plastic division houses a fully staffed 
Global Aesthetics Program, we have to assume some ceding of ground on 
the part of contemporary art.49
However, in his contribution to this issue, Stephen Voyce offers a com-
pelling argument for how contemporary work in poetics that push such 
processes of (aesthetic) appropriation and cultural “cocreation” beyond 
their usual limits might reclaim art’s prismatic function. Like many of 
the aforementioned theorists, Voyce returns to Marcel Duchamp’s ready-
mades as a pivotal moment in thinking through the potential of aesthetics 
today; however, rather than reading these works either as the beginning 
of relational art as a paradigm or as the beginning of the end of the bound-
aries separating aesthetic production and economic production, Voyce 
locates their unique position within the parallel histories of (post)mod-
ernist art, intellectual property legislation, and cultural appropriation.50 
For Voyce, such an entwined genealogy emphasizes, most generally, the 
crucial temporal context of appropriative art such as Duchamp’s and its 
effects in its own time, the fact that “appropriation can be considered sub-
versive only if a given society, and its attendant legal apparatus and cultural 
institution, deem it illicit” (408). More importantly, however, it provides 
the conditions for analyzing the aesthetics and politics of contemporary 
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appropriative and “collaborative” art such as the encoding of a poem into 
a DNA strand that will be implanted into a living bacterium (Christian 
Bök’s Xenotext), the construction of a “collaborative MFA” in Creative 
Writing from pieces of text donated by eighty-five individuals (Rachel 
Zolf’s The Tolerance Project), and a series of book proposals and writing 
directives combined into 830 unpunctuated lines (Darren Wershler-Hen-
ry’s the tapeworm foundry).
Duchamp’s gambit in entering a signed urinal (Fountain) into the 1917 
Society of Independent Artists exhibition was designed around the care-
ful calculation of the effects it would produce, given its setting—quite 
literally so, in a note entitled “Algebraic Comparison” included in Duch-
amp’s The Green Box (1934). The equation contained in “Algebraic Com-
parison,” as Thierry du Duve has suggested, was likely both an ironic 
comment on Cubists’ interest in “arithmetical proportion” as well as a 
functional mapping of whether, in what way, and for how long, works 
such as Fountain could have their intended or anticipated effect.51 More 
specifically, Duchamp’s “Comparison” details the contextual necessities 
for Fountain to refract existing tensions between mass production and 
handicraft, and between the artist as creator and the artist as selector, 
from the general boundaries of what could constitute art to the “open 
admittance” nature of the Society’s exhibition (one violated in spirit, if 
not in letter, when the jury accepted Fountain but hid it behind a partition 
during the exhibition).52 These conditions created what Duchamp called 
the “possibilities” of the readymade as an intervention into the aesthet-
ics of his time, as well the narrow window in which it could generate its 
anticipated effects.
Using Duchamp’s “Algebraic Comparison” as a benchmark, we might 
categorize the artists that Voyce forwards as an incipient avant-garde for 
today in at least three ways. First, for all of them, as for Duchamp, poetics 
becomes a way to mark off transitional moments in contemporary modes 
of production and the various institutional systems that demarcate and 
regulate creative activity. Here we move from the growth of industrial 
mass production in Duchamp’s time, and the question of aesthetic pro-
priety, to the rise of ubiquitous computing technologies, bioinformatics, 
crowdsourcing, and “economies of contribution” of today and attendant 
questions of intellectual property (from Kenneth Goldsmith’s refashion-
ing of himself from writer to a “word processor,” to Bök’s integration of 
human language and genetic engineering, to Zolf’s sourcing and distribu-
tion of adaptable poetic passages). Secondly, we might say that, for all of 
these artists, the force of the work emerges not so much through a calcu-
lated “operation” of its discrete and immediate effects, but through the 
360 ANTONIO CERASO AND JEFF PRUCHNIC
open and aleatory “program” of possibilities for their future modification 
and adaptation.
More specifically, as Voyce writes, the design of their work draws its 
impact precisely through its disjunctive qualities with how such variants 
operate in everyday culture, most specifically their function to “prob-
lematize, baffle, and defy the enclosures of intellectual property regimes” 
(420) by deliberately violating intellectual property legislation and more 
specific institutional norms for the identification and authorization of 
creative activity. In this sense, these poetic works grouped here might be 
seen as offering an update on Duchamp’s “Algebraic Comparison” via 
something like an “Algorithmic Contrast”: artistic productions that both 
engage and exploit the general production methods of contemporary 
capitalism—namely, the flexible, open-ended, and “cocreative” nature of 
economic production today—while also emphasizing its novel disparities 
and points of tension. More importantly, as Voyce emphasizes, it is this 
process that simultaneously constitutes both the “aesthetics” of what he 
deems an incipient “Open Source Poetics”—its power to refract meth-
ods of cultural production, to be the “social antithesis” of contemporary 
society—as well as its politics, a process that Voyce wants to forward and 
make more material by adapting the early organizing principles of “free” 
and open source software production in guiding aesthetic production.
Finally, and returning to the concepts introduced in the section on me-
diation in open source culture, we might also consider the ways in which 
these works retrofit Duchamp’s commentary on aesthetics and utility 
in Fountain and certain other readymades. If Duchamp’s removal of a 
urinal from the realm of utility and his presentation of it as a work of 
art in Fountain forced questions about the status and purpose of art and 
artists in the moment of mass production and standardized labor, then 
Voyce’s chosen examples seem to be responding to similar questions dur-
ing the moment of just-in-time and niche production, of immaterial labor 
(and commodities). In reference to the troubling of logos/techne distinc-
tions outlined earlier, we might say these works engage a more specific 
 (in) distinction—one Heidegger was fond of emphasizing—internal to 
techne itself in early Greek culture: its roles as designating both technical 
mastery and the creation and utilitarian tools as well its role of aesthetic 
production proper, or poeisis. In this sense, Wershler-Henry’s transforma-
tion of writing guidelines and project ideas into a single-line poem, or 
Zolf’s collection of poetic fragments that she tags with bar codes and hosts 
online for the use of any other writer, are perhaps the most appropriate 
update to Duchamp’s gesture, a fashioning of items that will be both, or 
move back and forth between, a status as aesthetic objects in their own 
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right and one as tools for the use of others. As such, they both represent 
and perform the complexities of current modes of economic production 
while also functioning as a critique of the ways the benefits of these prac-
tices are unequally distributed.
It would be tempting to expand this last vector common to the art-
ists Voyce gathers in his essay—an artwork’s “quantum state” between 
function and form, or technics and representation—to works outside of 
poetics that also seem to equally engage the question of open source cul-
ture as we have defined it here. These might include, most obviously, 
other works in bio art, such as Eduardo Kac’s participation in creating the 
genetically modified rabbit Alba, a “chimera” that contains genes com-
mon to jellyfish and that flouresces green when exposed to the proper 
lighting. As Kac himself has written, such work emphasizes the ways in 
which contemporary technology enables the move from “representation 
to reality” in artistic praxis.53 Further, we might consider various works 
in “tactical media” and art activism around computing technologies, such 
as Steve Mann’s provocations around closed operating systems and user 
agreements, as similarly finding their moment of critique through a con-
flation of use and representation.54 Finally, and perhaps furthest afield, 
one might suggest that even current works that conflate classical meth-
ods of aesthetic craftsmanship with contemporary spectacle—such as Da-
mien Hirst’s For the Love of God (2007), a platinum cast of a skull adorned 
in over eight thousand high-quality diamonds, or Marc Quinn’s Siren 
(2008), a sculpture of Kate Moss made out of 18-carat gold—fit within 
this frame. Although the political implications of these works seem far re-
moved from the other examples, the return to labor-intensive methods of 
craftsmanship, and the use of materials (diamonds, platinum, gold) that 
are “intrinsically valuable” regardless of their relationship to the work 
itself, certainly seem to demonstrate an anxiety about, if not a critique of, 
the ways in which labor, value, and aesthetics have changed in the last few 
decades (including the experienced need to safeguard the value of a work 
in an age wherein visual art can be easily duplicated or appropriated).
Voyce, however, rightfully provides us something much more specific 
and significant here via his analyses of works and artists responding in 
more pointed and directed ways to these broad cultural and economic 
changes, and through perhaps the most appropriately democratic me-
dium: poetics. In this sense, his depiction of these poets’ adaptions and 
subversions of contemporary standards of intellectual property and im-
material labor shows them very much performing the traditional role 
Peter Osborne has assigned to avant-garde movements within “periodiza-
tion,” marking a moment of “cultural self-consciousness” that makes it 
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possible to conceptualize more clearly the present in relation to the past.55 
In this sense, as Voyce seems to suggest, they might also be marking out 
the future possibilities for not just poetics, but aesthetics as a whole, one 
that might be read as a positive inversion of the often degraded scheme of 
artistic reception that Jacques Rancière has dubbed the ethical regime: the 
consideration of aesthetic works in regards to “the question of their origin 
(and consequently their truth content) and the question of their end or 
purpose, the uses they are put to and the effects they result in.”56 Although 
this tradition has a rather morose history—often marked by iconicity and 
iconoclasm, elitism, and moralism—Voyce emphasizes how asking these 
questions today might affirm the acts of appropriation and collaboration 
constitutive of aesthetic production as a counterpoint to the catachretic 
leveraging of the same in contemporary culture at large. In this sense, the 
works Voyce identifies provide a new “end or purpose” for the political 
impact of contemporary poetics, even as the poets’ work offers itself out 
to an “endless” future of adaptation and repurposing by their audiences.
The Political Economy of Open Source
We now return to a category that has, to some extent, haunted our analy-
sis of media form and aesthetics from the outset: political economy. That 
the question of economy should adhere so closely to these other categories 
is not particularly surprising if we examine one of the central premises of 
open source culture: Production, which is to say, the production of value, 
confined in the industrial age to clearly demarcated spaces (the factory, 
the office, the studio, the lecture hall) escapes from its traditional sites and 
begins to function in spaces of consumption (the garage, the coffeehouse, 
the bedroom, and, with the increasing saturation of mobile devices and 
network capabilities, anywhere across the social terrain). To the extent that 
the closed spaces of industrial capitalism also mapped time to location, 
this movement outside those spaces triggers a corresponding extension of 
the time of production, so that production can now happen anytime. To 
be sure, these developments were already presaged by the just-in-time 
methods of Toyotism, to the extent that they folded the supply chain and 
consumer demand more fully into the production site while demanding 
from line workers an indefinite readiness and communicative capacity 
to contribute to quality improvement efforts on the shop floor. Open 
source culture can be said to intensify even that process, resulting in an 
anywhere-anytime production regime that enfolds the whole of social life 
while inviting contributions from an indefinite group, someone.
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Unlike mid-twentieth-century concerns that an economic and tech-
nical rationality invades and eliminates forms of life and thought more 
properly approached in political or social terms—a problem that already 
obsessed Hannah Arendt, Jacques Ellul, and other thinkers of the Fordist 
era—both the problem and the promise of open source political economy 
would seem to be that the social retains its distinct character as it becomes 
productive. This phenomenon generally elicits two responses. The first 
response sees the insertion of sociality into production as potentially lib-
erating, a restructuring of economic and social relations that opens paths 
to greater autonomy and more inclusive political culture. The second re-
sponse, as might be expected, takes a somewhat dimmer view, reading the 
introduction of the social into production as both an expansion and in-
tensification of the valorization process and its exploitative relationships.
The first view could be said to ground the economic analysis in Yochai 
Benkler’s oft-cited The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Trans-
forms Markets and Freedom (2006). Benkler argues that the social sphere 
is relatively unchanged in terms of its basic operations; what changes, 
rather, is the “relative salience of social sharing and exchange as a modal-
ity of economic production.”57 The everyday social interactions and non-
monetary motivations that once happened outside the time and space of 
work have, in this view, “come to play a substantial role as modes of mo-
tivating, informing, and organizing productive behavior at the very core 
of the information economy.”58 It should be noted that the availability of 
this changed role, has, for Benkler, roots that can themselves be analyzed 
in economic terms, where the “capital costs of effective economic action 
in industrial societies” moved the kinds of social sharing and contribution 
we see today to the “economic peripheries—to households in advanced 
economies,” while the “restructuring of capital investment in digital net-
works . . . are in part reversing that effect.”59 The result of this distinctly 
historical transformation is the increasing importance of nonmarket mo-
tivations within the valorization process, such that many producers would 
be motivated primarily by states like satisfaction or enjoyment (just for 
fun, as Torvalds insists) rather than the wage or some monetary return 
on investment. Of course, market rewards must continue to operate, but 
the old closed firms will have to rethink both their internal organizational 
structures and their social role, in part because “users cannot be ordered 
around like employees.”60
We might take as an example one of the darlings of similar discourse, 
the T-shirt company Threadless, for which users submit and score T-
shirt designs, the winners of which scoring are then produced and sold 
through the website. Read through Benkler’s lens, people contributing 
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T-shirt designs certainly seek to have their shirts printed, which would 
gain them some monetary reward, but they also seek the comments, 
feedback, praise, and companionship they might receive on the scoring 
engine; similarly, those who just score and comment on shirts are con-
tributing value to the company and could be said to be incentivized, so to 
speak, merely by a feeling of community.
The porousness of the closed sites of production increases, with so-
cial motivation entering into the expanded production site and coexisting 
with the old market relations. It might be added, however, that Benkler’s 
reliance on incentives structured around “emotional and psychological 
needs for companionship and mutual recognition” already explicitly per-
forms the move in the other direction, enfolding within the process of val-
orization the cognitive, affective, and communicative dimensions in their 
totality, all of which end up analyzable in economic terms. At that point, 
Benkler’s proviso that we need not assume any “fundamental change in 
the nature of humanity” is itself unnecessary to recognize the ontological 
claim lurking in the method. The historical problem of industrial capital-
ism was in this view its limited ontological outlook; it was, in its refusal 
of nonmarket incentives for production, never quite capitalist enough. 
In any case, while Benkler presents a largely economic prospectus, the 
changes he describes promise social returns of near hedge-fund (or even 
Madoffian) proportions, where “producing information, knowledge, and 
culture through social, rather than market and proprietary relations” can 
create “opportunities for greater autonomous action, a more critical cul-
ture, a more discursively engaged and better informed republic, and per-
haps a more equitable global community.”61
As we’ve seen, a major strain of critical discourse addressing the gen-
eral transformation of production can be located in the Italian autonomist 
tradition, which has occupied itself with the movement of production 
“outside the factory” (and the corresponding insufficiency of ground-
ing valorization in the temporal form of industrial production) since the 
1960s and 1970s.62 One of the most pressing concerns from the perspec-
tives that can be roughly grouped under this banner is that the introduc-
tion of social, cognitive, and communicative qualities into production 
raises the problem of unremunerated labor. In open source culture, this 
problem can be considered in very concrete terms as distinct productive 
activity resulting in profit for a business while the activity goes unpaid 
for, as Tiziana Terranova argues in “Free Labor: Producing Culture for 
the Digital Economy” (2000).63 Of course, the usual models provide some 
compensation for selected productivity. One could not say of Threadless, 
for instance, “My T-shirt design sold ten thousand units, and all I got was 
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this lousy T-shirt.” To follow out Terranova’s implications, however, one 
might note that all the losing T-shirt submissions constitute the value of 
Threadless as much as the winning submissions, as do the freely contrib-
uted comments and ratings. At a more abstract level, Paolo Virno de-
velops the problem of unremunerated labor outside specific productive 
activities. Not unlike Benkler, Virno notes the historical shift that allows 
“generic human faculties” that had been excluded in industrial capital-
ism to be “included fully within the time-space of production.”64 While 
this arrangement transforms the extraction of surplus value, however, it 
does not eliminate it. Rather, Virno suggests that surplus value is now 
found where social cooperation becomes generally productive, in a gap 
that opens between “production time (which includes non-labor, its own 
distinct productivity) and labor time.”65 In this sense, it is not merely that 
specific activities are unremunerated but rather that when the time of 
(social) life and the time of (directly productive) labor collapse into each 
other, we are left with “unremunerated life.”66 Given this view, we can 
begin to see what drives the cost savings on the “full Brooksian overhead” 
trumpeted by Eric Raymond.
Analysts in the autonomist tradition have sought to determine where such 
a surplus—which begins to look very much like primitive  accumulation—
actually goes. Terranova, in her more recent work, has sought an “abstract 
line that crosses the ‘new New Economy’ of the web 2.0 and the mass fi-
nancialization of the 1990s through to the new millennium.”67 Christian 
Marazzi is more explicit:
The relationship between accumulation, profits, and fi-
nancialization is reinterpreted on the basis of the salient 
characteristics of post-Fordist production processes. The 
increase in profits fueling financialization was possible be-
cause, in biocapitalism, the very concept of accumulation 
of capital was transformed. It no longer consists, as in the 
Fordist time, of investment in constant and variable capital 
(wage), but rather of investment in apparatuses of produc-
ing and capturing value produced outside directly produc-
tive processes.68
If, in other words, the recent financial crisis was driven in some part by 
a “giant pool of money” seeking greater returns, the recent autonomist-
inspired work begins to draw the lines between the bit, the brick, and the 
balloon, which is to say, between the rise of unremunerated social produc-
tion in “networked information economies” and financial outlets of the 
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surplus in the housing and securities markets.69 Certainly, this is a very 
different result flowing from the revenue stream of open source cultural 
production than the potential political returns projected by Benkler.
While Benkler and Virno’s depictions of social production differ, how-
ever, they may be said to share a common narrative or schematic. Both 
accounts posit, more specifically, a radical historical change that begins to 
leverage existing social resources. The characteristics of this resource, of 
course, also differ; Benkler grounds them in the psychosocial needs of indi-
viduals, and Virno (perhaps more carefully than some of his critics even in 
the autonomist tradition give him credit for70) posits preindividual common 
characteristics, the “generic human faculties” that are put to work, but the 
structure of contemporary economic subjects and collectivities seems—in 
both cases—to function as essences, while the forces that either liberate or 
constrain them come from outside. It is on this point that Ben Robert’s con-
tribution seeks to intervene. While the majority of his critical attention is 
focused on Benkler’s economism, which is deemed “too static and asocial,” 
the force of the analysis falls on the problem of the concrete emergence or 
genesis of new social forms as such. Benkler’s argument, as Roberts has it, 
serves only to “explain how a particular mode of production can function-
ally compete with the market without really being able to account for how 
this change has come about” (385). The difficulty with positions like  Virno’s, 
by contrast, is that they similarly exclude the genetic work of politics by, as 
Alberto Toscano puts it in the essay from which Roberts draws some key 
concepts, developing a “speculative optimism which would look at the pre-
individual as the preindividual-of-humanity, the latency of a collective life 
which is always already possible, and precisely not as something that leads 
us towards politics by its very ‘inhuman,’ unconscious, and properly unlive-
able aspect.”71 If Virno’s analyses of contemporary political economy tend 
to end on rather gloomy, or at best “ambivalent,” notes, it is because they 
seem to be grounded in fundamental social traits that cannot themselves 
be programmed or activated. The social force of open source culture must, 
for Roberts, be properly political, viewed not as “some force prior to” con-
temporary political economy “that is in the process of being unharnessed,” 
but as a “process” in which new social entities take shape (401). The social 
cannot be viewed “from the perspective of the individual or the collective 
as an a priori” (401). Dispensing with the a priori as Roberts suggests might 
allow us to get a better handle on the subjective transformations wrought 
by open source culture, and the particular relationship developing between 
social and economic rewards.
The Web 2.0 business gurus have managed to studiously avoid connec-
tions between networked information economies and financialization, 
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while concentrating rather effectively on the more limited problem of 
particular free labor: if all this user contribution is exploitative, it doesn’t 
seem to come with that old alienation; indeed, people seem to derive all 
manner of satisfaction from such productive participation, even if it is 
unpaid. This defense is already implicit in Benkler’s more careful con-
struction of nonmarket motivations, which would posit satisfaction and 
other psychological and social rewards (like fulfilling the need for com-
panionship) as the remuneration itself, or as what might be called affec-
tive returns. Following Roberts, we could first seek a genealogical basis 
for such developments rather than viewing them as the pure leveraging 
of existing qualities. Foucault, for example, detects the emergence of a 
discourse on affective returns in a series of early neoliberal theoretical ar-
guments. Rethinking the conceptual position of both consumption and 
labor as grounded in exchange, emerging neoliberalism sought to recast 
both the worker and the consumer as an enterprise, a kind of investor, or 
entrepreneur of the self:
The man of consumption, insofar as he consumes, is a 
producer. What does he produce? Well, quite simply, he 
produces his own satisfaction. And we should think of con-
sumption as the enterprise activity by which the individual, 
precisely on the basis of the capital he has at his disposal, 
will produce something that will be his own satisfaction.72
Certainly, the conceptual transformation of the consumer from a part-
ner of exchange to an investor seeking affective returns differs somewhat 
from that other figure dominating the contemporary discourse of open 
source culture, the prosumer deriving social satisfaction from making ac-
tual products. At the same time, if the subjective space for the prosumer’s 
emergence in practice was already prepared in the doctrinal statements 
of mid-twentieth-century economic neoliberalism, it is at least necessary 
to rethink Benkler’s suggestion that preexisting social desires become ec-
onomically productive when restructured capital relationships open up 
network information economies.
We might further historicize the enterprise subject and social re-
muneration through the work of Franco Berardi, who, in The Soul at 
Work: From Alienation to Autonomy (2009), explores both the subjectiv-
ity of the entrepreneur of the self and the kinds of molecular social gen-
esis pointed to by Roberts. For Berardi, alienation does indeed disappear 
among particular kinds of cognitive workers, while “enterprise and labor 
are less opposed in the social perception and in the cognitive worker’s 
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consciousness.”73 If cognitive workers, for Berardi, “invest their specific 
competences, their creative, innovative and communicative energies in the 
labor process,” an investment that is both economic and psychological, the 
value at risk must also be calculated across those domains. Berardi can thus 
attribute various psychopathologies to what might be called an open source 
mode of production (panic, depression, “catastrophic overturnings of the 
investments of collective desire”); at the very least, such a move introduces 
the other side of the ledger, so to speak, for the much vaunted social remu-
neration and affective returns.74 The asymmetry between the production of 
(market) value remunerated by satisfaction and other social rewards was 
always, in this view, a way of keeping two sets of books, since it never ac-
counted for the affective losses that might occur in such a process. If pro-
sumption is recast as an investment activity resulting in affective gains, what 
Berardi shows us is that the risked “capital” and losses of the entrepreneurs 
of the self may themselves be affective rather than purely market-based. 
The prosumers of open source culture who contribute so freely—and who 
might, from the perspective of an enterprise society, be better thought of as 
contripreneurs, or contributors- entrepreneurs—don’t merely expend time 
in exchange for social remuneration. The figure of the prosumer is still too 
old economy in this regard. Rather, they invest psychosocial capital, so to 
speak, and perhaps even at scary levels of leverage. The proponents of social 
production are fond of looking to satisfaction as way to swerve around the 
disappearance of the wage; they seem less inclined to conduct a risk analy-
sis of affective investment. If such a transformation of the social requires a 
kind of therapy, Berardi, like Roberts, turns to “the processes of transversal 
formation of those unstable, varying, temporary, singular aggregates that 
are called subjectivities.”75
Leisha Jones explores an instance of such processes in her contribu-
tion, “Contemporary Bildungsroman and the Prosumer Girl.” Stitching 
together the old media circulation of the paper Twilight novels, the social 
production that could be said to constitute YouTube’s economic model, 
and transversal girl subjectivities, Jones lays out in detail one complex 
site where media form, political aesthetics, and economies of contribu-
tion produce a deeply ambiguous network of relationships. In part, these 
relationships demonstrate how well Benkler’s lessons on structuring pro-
sumer activities have been learned and integrated into production; for ex-
ample, Jones writes that “[t]he Prosumer Revisited 2009 conference held 
in Frankfurt, Germany, featuring a cast of international interdisciplinary 
prosumer scholars, was actually sponsored in part by eBay” (449). The 
publishers of the Twilight novels, for their part, readily recognize “girl 
prosumption of the Twilight franchise functions as free viral advertising” 
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so it “is permitted to exist without prosecution for copyright violation” 
(451). We can see here—and in countless other cases, to be sure—the 
eventual settlement between the so-called content industries and similar 
prosumer activities as it hovers on the horizon. From the perspective of 
the valorization process, the prosumer girls of Jones’s account can be said 
to derive both individual and social satisfaction while also generating the 
surplus for any number of market-based concerns.
But Jones, like Roberts, is after other quarry: in the midst of these 
political-economic functions, the girl prosumers of her account reshape 
the interiorizing function of the bildungsroman, transforming it into a 
process that does something other than produce Subjects while pulling 
the gendered expectations of the novels apart into new and unexpected 
aggregates (451). The operations that Roberts suggests for producers of 
free software are, in this sense, actually accomplished by Jones in the case 
of girl fans; in the process, she demonstrates both the girl prosumers’ dis-
tance from “the male-dominated realms of computer-based technology 
and organized fandom” and the general capacity for shaping and reshap-
ing subjectivities. We might turn, then, to Jones’s claim that “the lines 
between the Web prosumer, the corporate-sponsored prosumer poseur, 
and the professional cultural producer blur” (449). The discussion of po-
litical economy in open source culture will perhaps be located there, and 
it may even be far more likely to be located in those blurred lines than on 
the terrain of intellectual property. If the political economy of open source 
culture has lessons for us, as Roberts and Jones indicate, they are bound 
up in the peculiar relationships between the social and production, in the 
affective and economic effects of multiple forms of capital circulation, 
and, perhaps above all, in our capacities to generate novel aggregates.
At the risk of collapsing yet another distinction in an essay that has 
already engaged some familiar ones (between production and consump-
tion, or labor and leisure) and argued for the recognition of some new ones 
(between mediation and technics in culture, representation and action in 
aesthetics), we conclude here by suggesting one more. One of the more 
difficult lessons presented by the political economy of open source may 
be this: if it gives us both the utopian hopes for participatory cultural and 
economic production and the more dystopian analyses that detect some 
parallelism between expanded participation and expansive exploitation, 
both views have turned out to be equally correct. On the one hand, open 
source and cocreative methods have made both economic and cultural 
production more flexible and efficient and transparent while also ren-
dering production more responsive to the “needs and desires” of a much 
larger number of individuals. On the other, these methods can be said to 
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have introduced novel and increasingly elusive forms of expropriation, 
the expansion of capital’s domain into once reserved psychosocial spaces, 
and perhaps even dangerous forms of accumulation. Another way of say-
ing this would be that while open source culture is by no means what we 
hoped for, it is in fact precisely what we wanted. The complexity of open 
source culture certainly calls on cultural criticism to reexamine its theo-
retical approaches, particularly where they drag along a conceptual appa-
ratus perhaps more appropriate to previous forms of social organization 
and production. It also requires that we multiply the sites of entry, study, 
and critique—particularly where these have been perhaps too enthralled 
by the spectacle of the copyright wars. The essays collected here have con-
tributed in both these areas and thereby provided some code snippets, so 
to speak, for an expanding critical program. That is, at least, the spirit 
informing this special issue on “Open Source Culture and Aesthetics.”
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